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Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc.: Expanding
the Right of Apportionment and Municipal
Tort Liability
I. Introduction
Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,1 decided by a sharply divided
New York Court of Appeals,2 represents a modification of the
requirements for a defendant's claim of apportionment from
third parties. Garrett announced that a town may be held pro-
portionately liable to defendants for economic damages those
parties may sustain if a judgment against them is awarded to
motel guests who were injured in a serious fire.3 A claim for ap-
portionment was permitted, despite the absence of any actiona-
ble duty owed by the town to the plaintiffs, because defendants
alleged the town had breached an independent duty it owed to
the defendants. 4 Although the court explicitly denied defen-
dants' indemnification claim,5 it avoided calling defendants' ac-
tion contribution. Thus, it is unclear on which theory the court
based its decision.
Garrett also marks a clear expansion of municipal tort lia-
bility for negligent enforcement of statutes governing multiple
dwellings.' The court endorsed defendants' argument that the
Town of Greece had violated a special duty owed to them when
officials negligently enforced these statutes.7
Part II of this Note explores the legal background of third
1. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983), modifying 86 A.D.2d
469, 450 N.Y.S.2d 619 (4th Dep't 1982).
2. Judge Wachtler wrote for the majority and was joined by Judges Jones, Fuchs-
berg, and Meyer. Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Jasen dissented in part and voted to
affirm the decision of the appellate division. Judge Simons took no part in the decision of
the New York Court of Appeals as he had written the unanimous opinion of the appel-
late division.
3. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
4. Id. See infra notes 177-210 and accompanying text.
5. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
6. See infra notes 211-36 and accompanying text.
7. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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party claims for contribution and indemnity and the evolution
of municipal tort liability for negligent performance of statutory
duties. Part III presents the facts and procedural history of Gar-
rett and the decision of the New York Court of Appeals. Part IV
analyzes the reasoning and results of the decision of the court of
appeals. Part V concludes that a majority of New York's highest
court expanded municipal tort liability, at least to the extent of
avoiding patently inequitable results. In so doing, it changed the
requirements for a contribution claim and the special duty rule
which limits municipal tort liability.
II. Background
A. Contribution and Indemnity
Contribution and indemnity are analytically distinct con-
cepts.8 Contribution allows two or more tortfeasors who are lia-
ble to the same plaintiff for the same injury to compel each
other to pay a pro rata share of the judgment.9 For example, an
attorney sued by a former client for malpractice may compel a
second attorney to pay a portion of the damages awarded to the
plaintiff if it is proven that the second attorney's negligence ag-
gravated the loss sustained by the plaintiff.' Contribution is
8. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d 454, 435 N.E.2d 366, 450
N.Y.S.2d 149 (1982). The court discussed the history of contribution, indemnity, and
apportionment, holding that the "special benefit" rule permits a municipality to seek
apportionment of damages from a joint tortfeasor because each has breached a duty
owed to an injured plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured when she tripped on a metal disk
which had been placed in a public sidewalk by a former owner of an abutting premise for
the enhancement of his property. The city had had actual knowledge of this unsafe con-
dition and had failed to correct it. Id. See also McDermott v. City of New York, 50
N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1980); 2A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, NEw
YORK CrvIL PRACTICE 1401.10 (1983); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 50-52 (4th ed.
1971). But see 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Contribution, Indemnity, Subrogation § 84 (1982) (stat-
ing that the right of apportionment has had the practical effect of eliminating the dis-
tinction between these two concepts).
9. See Smith v. Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82, 87, 417 N.E.2d 530, 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d 236,
238 (1981). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970)
("[Wihere two or more persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same
harm, there is a right of contribution among them, even though the judgment has not
been recovered against any or all of them."); 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 8, § 1 ("Contri-
bution has been defined as the equalization of a burden as between persons under a
common liability.").
10. See Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 83, 444 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981).
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based on the equitable principle "that those who voluntarily as-
sume a common burden shall bear it in equal proportions."'" In-
demnity, by contrast, requires a party who ought to be responsi-
ble in damages to an injured party to pay the individual who has
been held legally liable. 12 Therefore, an employer held liable to
an injured person solely on the basis of respondeat superior for
the negligent conduct of an employee may seek reimbursement
from the employee for any judgment paid on his account.13 In-
demnity is a concept which rests on contract principles -ex-
press or implied.' 4 Although the differences between indemnity
and contribution are not always clearly discernable, indemnity
involves the situation where the third party is called on to reim-
burse the defendant for everything he has paid, rather than for
only a portion of the judgment.'5
Indemnification allows the party who has been legally com-
pelled to pay for the wrong committed by another to recover
damages paid to the injured plaintiff from the wrongdoer.' 6 The
duty to indemnify is recognized
where community opinion would consider that in justice the re-
sponsibility should rest upon one rather than the other. This may
be because of the relation of the parties to one another, and the
consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a significant dif-
ference in the kind or quality of their conduct. 7
11. 23 N.Y. Jim. 2D, supra note 8, § 10.
12. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 460-61, 435 N.E.2d at 368-69,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
[Indemnity] may be defined as an obligation or duty resting on one person to
make good or to make reimbursement for any loss or damage another has incurred
while acting at his request or for his benefit, or any loss or damage resulting from
the conduct of one of the parties or of some other person or from a specified
contingency.
23 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 8, § 2 (footnote omitted).
"[Indemnity] shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to
pay for it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead." W. PROSSER, supra
note 8, § 51 (footnote omitted).
13. 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 8, § 64.
14. See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278
N.Y. 175, 15 N.E. 567 (1938); 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 8, § 2. Indemnity is a branch
of contract law. The right to indemnity rests on either an express or implied contract. Id.
15. See 2A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, supra note 8, 1 1401.09; 23 N.Y. Jui. 2D,
supra note 8, § 2; W. PROSS ER, supra note 8, § 51.
16. See supra note 12.
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 51.
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Thus, a claim for indemnification must involve an analysis of
the relationship of the defendant to the third party from whom
damages are sought.18 Contribution, on the other hand, involves
an analysis of the relationship of the defendant and of a third
party to the plaintiff to determine whether both have caused the
plaintiff an injury through breach of a duty each owes the plain-
tiff, and, if so, whether one tortfeasor has paid more than his fair
share.19
The common law prohibition against contribution 20 among
joint tortfeasors was eliminated in New York by statute in
1928.21 Nevertheless, this legislation provided only for distribu-
tion of loss on a pro rata basis among defendants against whom
the plaintiff had actually recovered a judgment.22 Therefore, if
the plaintiff chose to sue only one tortfeasor, that tortfeasor had
no right to contribution from the others.23 Although the defend-
ant was bound by this rigid rule of contribution, the common
law cause of action for indemnification, in modified form, was
used to afford relief to the judgment debtor in a case where he
18. See 2A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MLLER, supra note 8, 1401.10.
19. See Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d at 5, 429 N.E.2d at 84, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 565; 2A
WEINSTEIN-KORN-MLLER, supra note 8, 1401.10.
20. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 460, 435 N.E.2d at 368, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 151; W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 50 (tracing the history and rationale of the
prohibition against contribution among tortfeasors).
21. Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 714, § 211-a, 1928 N.Y. Laws 1549 (repealed 1962).
Section 211-a provided:
Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defen-
dants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, and such judg-
ment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each
defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled to
contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over and
above the pro rata share of the defendant or defendants making such payments;
provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other such
defendant an amount greater than his pro rate share of the entire judgment. Such
recovery may be had in a separate action; or where the parties have appeared in
the original action, a judgment may be entered by one such defendant against the
other by motion on notice.
Id.
22. In D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 460, 435 N.E.2d at 368, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 151, the court explained that the contribution law enacted in 1928 only per-
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alone had been sued.2 4
To modify the harsh results of the statutory right of contri-
bution, which permitted a defendant who had paid more than
his fair share to recover only from another judgment debtor,2
the courts recognized a right of implied indemnity.2 6 Implied in-
demnity permitted a defendant to recover from a third party in
two circumstances. First, the defendant may have been held re-
sponsible to the plaintiff solely by imputation of law, though he
was personally free of fault.27 Such imputation of liability could
occur where the defendant was vicariously liable, an innocent
partner, or one who was induced to do wrong by the misrepre-
sentation of another.2 8 Second, implied indemnity could be used
by a judgment debtor who, though not entirely free of personal
fault, had been only passively or secondarily negligent.2 9 In both
situations, a right to indemnity has been implied by law to
achieve equitable results.30
As the concept of implied indemnity evolved, courts permit-
ted its use as a basis for a claim against a third party who owed
a duty to an injured plaintiff but who for some reason was
shielded from liability to the plaintiff.3 Schubert v. Schubert
Wagon Co. 3 2 illustrates this concept in circumstances where the
defendant was free from personal fault but had been held vicari-
ously liable. In Schubert, a husband, while acting in the course
of his employment, injured his wife. Although the husband owed
a duty of care to his wife, her direct action against him was
barred by interspousal immunity from tort liability." This im-
24. Id. at 460-61, 435 N.E.2d at 368-69, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
26. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 461, 435 N.E.2d at 368-69,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 152. Implied indemnity involved determining relative degrees of culpa-
bility and in practice, such determinations were often difficult to make; moreover, dam-
ages were not ratable but were shifted entirely to the active tortfeasor. Id.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 51.
28. Id.
29. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 461, 435 N.E.2d at 369, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 152.
30. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 51.
31. See Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); West-
chester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15
N.E.2d 567 (1938).
32. 249 N.Y. 253, 255-56, 164 N.E. 42, 42 (1928).




munity did not bar the wife's suit directly against the employer
on the theory of respondeat superior.3 4 The court recognized in
dicta that the husband might be called upon to indemnify his
employer for damages the employer paid as a result of the hus-
band's negligence, although no suit could have been brought di-
rectly against the husband.38
By contrast, Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester
County Small Estates Corp." involved a claim based on implied
indemnity by a defendant who was only passively or secondarily
liable. There a utility company, which had been held liable for a
worker's death, was permitted to seek indemnification from the
worker's employer, although a direct suit by the worker against
the employer would have been barred by the workers' compensa-
tion law.37 The court recognized an independent duty of the em-
ployer to the utility company which justified a claim for
indemnity. 8
Clearly, allowing a right of action based on implied indem-
nification addressed situations in which both the defendant and
the third party had wronged the plaintiff and ought to have
been held responsible for payment of damages. Use of indemnifi-
cation instead of contribution, however, had the unfortunate re-
sult of shifting all liability for damages to the more culpable of
the tortfeasors, rather than of apportioning it between them on
the basis of their relative degrees of fault.3 9
Recognizing the injustice of this result, the New York Court
of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.40 provided for a right of
apportionment and eliminated the requirement of a joint judg-
ment. 1 It permitted the sharing of loss among tortfeasors re-
gardless of the nature or degree of their culpability. 2 This flex-
34. Id. at 255-56, 164 N.E. at 42.
35. Id. at 257, 164 N.E. at 43.
36. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
37. Id. at 177-80, 15 N.E.2d 566-69.
38. Id. at 180, 15 N.E.2d at 568-69.
39. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d at 461, 435 N.E.2d at 369, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 152.
40. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
41. Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88. See 23 N.Y. Jum. 2D,
supra note 8, § 81 (summarizing judicial interpretation and commentary about the pur-
pose and scope of Dole).
42. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
[Vol. 4:673
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ible rule of apportionment was soon codified as CPLR article
14,43 amending New York's contribution statute." This article 45
specifically allows apportionment among parties subject to
claims for contribution, thus eliminating the need for a concept
(1972). See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting, 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972). The court stated:
Prior to our recent decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. .... it had been held
to be the rule that a defendant found guilty of "active" negligence could not re-
cover over against another guilty of "active" tort negligence. The rule as stated in
Dole now permits apportionment of damages among joint or concurrent tort-
feasors regardless of the degree or nature of the concurring fault. We believe the
new rule of apportionment to be pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair.
To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay
the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally negligent seems inequi-
table and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion
to the allocable concurring fault.
Id. (citation omitted).
43. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976). This article provides:
Section 1401.
Except as provided in section 15-108 of the general obligations law, two or
more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same injury, injury
to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or
not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the per-
son from whom contribution is sought.
Section 1402.
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess
paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the
injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute an amount greater
than his equitable share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance
with the relative culpability of each person liable for the contribution.
Section 1403.
A cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a separate action or by
cross-claim, counterclaim or third party claims in a pending action.
Section 1404.
(a) Nothing contained in this article shall impair the rights of any person
entitled to damages under existing law.
(b) Nothing contained in this article shall impair any right of indemnity as
subrogation under existing law.
Id.
The Judicial Conference which recommended this legislation and drafted its lan-
guage clarified that "a central premise of [the] Article [CPLR 1401] is that Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co. and its progeny should be viewed as modifying the doctrine of contribution
in New York, rather than completely revamping the law of indemnity." TWENTIETH AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION,
N.Y. LEGIs. Doc. No. 90, at 216 (1975) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
44. Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 714, § 211-a, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1549 (repealed 1962).




of implied indemnification.'" Therefore, an examination of the
legal relationship among tortfeasors is unnecessary.
Under pre-Garrett cases interpreting the statute, a legally
sufficient claim for contribution had to allege that the defendant
and the party from whom contribution was sought shared a com-
mon liability for the injury the plaintiff had sustained. 7 The op-
eration of this prerequisite in the context of municipal tort lia-
bility is illustrated by Barry v. Niagara Frontier Transit
System, Inc.4' There a defendant company, which had negli-
gently allowed a passenger to exit from a bus at a hazardous
location, sought proportionate damages from the village, which
had failed to properly maintain the street and sidewalk at the
location.'9 Village law recognized liability for injuries caused by
the dangerous condition of a sidewalk if, among other things, no-
tice of the condition had been received by the village before the
plaintiff sustained an injury. In Barry, the required notice had
not been given; thus, a duty to repair the sidewalk had not
arisen.5 1 Absent a duty to repair the sidewalk, no liability
arose.5' Absent liability, a claim for apportionment was
insufficient.53
An important development in the law of contribution was
the modification of the threshold requirement of common liabil-
ity to the extent of allowing apportionment so long as the party
46. See 2A WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, supra note 8, 1401.10.
47. See, e.g., Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d at 5, 429 N.E.2d at 84, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 565
(explicitly noting that the relevant question for a claim of contribution under Dole and
CPLR § 1401 is whether the defendant and the party he wishes to implead both owed
duties to the plaintiff which each breached, thus contributing to the plaintiff's injury).
The drafters of CPLR § 1401 stated: "[l]t can be simply stated that there shall be no
right to contribution unless each of the parties from whom it is sought is or was subject
to liability for damages for the same harm to the injured party." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 43, at 216. The practice commentary to CPLR § 1401 indicates that the es-
sential requirement for contribution is common liability to the injured party. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1404 prac. commentary at 363 (McKinney 1976).
48. 35 N.Y.2d 629, 324 N.E.2d 312, 364 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1974).
49. Id. at 632, 324 N.E.2d at 313, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
50. Id. at 632-33, 324 N.E.2d at 313, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
51. Id. at 633-34, 324 N.E.2d at 313-14, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26.
52. Id. at 634, 324 N.E.2d at 314, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
53. Id. See also Farrell, Civil Practice, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 425, 444-45 (1976) (in
this survey of civil practice cases, Barry is mentioned as illustrating the principle that a
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from whom contribution is sought owes a duty to the injured
party." Thus, although a party might have been free of liability
for his breach of duty to the injured party because of a special
defense, he may still be subject to a claim for contribution. 5 In
Klinger v. Dudley,5' the court of appeals identified several cir-
cumstances in which the court would be willing to allow contri-
bution on the basis of a common duty rather than a common
liability to the plaintiff: (1) plaintiff has failed to sue the contri-
bution defendant but could have done so; 57 (2) plaintiff is unable
to sue the contribution defendant because of a special preclu-
sion;5 8 and (3) plaintiff may not sue the contribution defendant
because a statute prescribes an exclusive remedy.5 9
In Nolechek v. Gesuale,60 however, the New York Court of
Appeals required a showing of neither a common liability nor a
common duty to the injured plaintiff, permitting contribution
from a party who had violated an independent duty owed to the
defendant. The court's reasoning, however, apparently was influ-
enced by the special circumstances of the case.61 In Nolechek,
54. See Rogers v. Dorchester Ass'n, 32 N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347
N.Y.S.2d 22, 31 (1973). The following statement in Rogers is often cited as giving the
correct rule for contribution. "The rule of apportionment applies when two or more tort-
feasors have shared, albeit in various degrees, in the responsibility by their conduct or
omissions in causing an accident, in violation of the duties they respectively owe the
injured person." Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff in Rogers obtained a judgment against a
building owner, its manager, and an elevator company. The court denied the elevator
company contribution from the owner and manager because the elevator company had
assumed the exclusive duty to maintain the elevators. Id. at 563, 300 N.E.2d at 408, 347
N.Y.S.2d at 30.
55. See Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d 362, 368, 361 N.E.2d 974, 978, 393 N.Y.S.2d
323, 328 (1977).
56. 41 N.Y.2d 362, 361 N.E.2d 974, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1977).
57. Id. at 368, 361 N.E.2d at 978, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
58. See id. at 365, 371, 361 N.E.2d at 976, 980, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 326, 330. The court
of appeals noted in dicta that if a special preclusion order denying a plaintiff's right to
sue one of several joint tortfeasors were granted (citing Klinger v. Dudley, 40 A.D.2d
1078, 339 N.Y.S.2d 223 (4th Dep't 1972)), and if the defendant who was a party to the
suit paid more than his pro rata share, such defendant would not be similarily precluded
from action against the joint tortfeasor whom plaintiff could not sue. Klinger v. Dudley,
41 N.Y.2d at 371, 361 N.E.2d at 980, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
59. See Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d at 368, 361 N.E.2d at 978, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 328
(discussing a case in which the workers' compensation law prescribes an exclusive rem-
edy for a plaintiff but does not bar a defendant who has paid more than his pro rata
share from seeking contribution).
60. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 340-41, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 345-46 (1978).
61. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Missing
9
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plaintiff's son had been killed when he drove a motorcycle into a
steel cable suspended across defendant's land.2 Plaintiff sued
the landowner who in turn impleaded the plaintiff, alleging that
the plaintiff's negligence in allowing his vision-impaired, unli-
censed son to operate a motorcycle had contributed to the acci-
dent." Under New York law, a parent owed no duty of adequate
supervision to his child." Therefore, contribution could not be
based on a breach of duty the third party defendant (father)
owed to the plaintiff (his child). 65 Instead, Nolechek permitted
contribution from a party who had violated an independent duty
to the defendant not to entrust a dangerous instrument to his
child. 6 The court looked to "the nexus between the breach of
that duty and the liability of the defendant to the primary
plaintiff. 6 7 In a later case, Smith v. Sapienza," however, the
court of appeals cautioned that Nolechek allowed contribution
because of its unique facts 9 and reiterated that contribution
generally "exists only when two or more tort-feasors share in the
responsibility for an injury, in violation of the duties they re-
spectively owe to the injured person. '70
Link-Contribution Without Common Liability: Nolechek v. Gesuale, 1 PACE L. REV.
453 (1981).
62. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
63. Id.
64. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364
N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-72 (1974) (a minor could not maintain a cause of action against his
parent for inadequate supervision).
65. One of the important, unique aspects of Nolechek is that Walter L. Nolechek
sued the defendant individually and as administrator of the estate of his deceased son.
This parent/plaintiff was the third party defendant from whom the defendant sought
contribution. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d at 332, 385 N.E.2d at 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
340.
66. See id. at 340-42, 385 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46.
67. Brief for Third Party Plaintiff Respondent-Appellant Comparato at 9, Garrett,
58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
68. 52 N.Y.2d 82, 417 N.E.2d 530, 436 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1981).
69. Id. at 86-87, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238. "That case [Nolechek]
merely applied, in rather unique circumstances, the established rule that an injured third
party possesses a cause of action against a parent who has negligently entrusted a dan-
gerous instrument to his child." Id. (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 87, 417 N.E.2d at 532-33, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (citations omitted). See also
Tymann, The Torts Opinions of Judge Domenick L. GabrieUi, 47 ALB. L. REV. 323
(1983). This commentator suggests that post-Nolechek decisions such as Smith reaf-
firmed the requirement of a duty running from the contribution defendant to the plain-
tiff. He suggests that the apparent inconsistency of Nolechek with these cases was har-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/6
GARRETT v. HOLIDAY INNS, INC.
B. Municipal Tort Immunity
At common law, the state, because of its favored status, was
immune"' from liability for the negligent acts or omissions of its
agents. 2 In 1929, the New York State Legislature passed the
Court of Claims Act,73 waiving sovereign immunity. As a result,
the state is held to the same standard of liability as private citi-
zens.7 4 The waiver is qualified, however, in that it merely with-
draws the defense of immunity for acts for which a private indi-
vidual would be responsible. It does not subject the government
to damages for acts a private person would not perform, such
as providing police and fire protection. Applying this qualified
waiver of sovereign immunity to municipal corporations has
posed special problems. A municipality has, simultaneously, the
characteristics of a governmental entity and of a private individ-
ual.76 Thus, it may be unclear for which acts a municipality may
monized on the basis of the reasoning of Judge Gabrielli who wrote a concurrence in
Nolechek. Judge Gabrielli stated that the plaintiff/father did commit a tort on his child
by virtue of conduct that was so egregious as to no longer fall within the category of
"parental supervision." Thus, on this reasoning the requirement of common duty was
met. Id. at 324-26.
71. See Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 204, 163 N.E. 732, 734 (1928); W.
PROSSER, supra note 8, § 131.
72. See Lockwood v. Village of Buchanan, 18 Misc. 2d 862, 182 N.Y.S.2d 754 (West-
chester County Ct. 1959) (discussing the concept of sovereign immunity which provides
the rationale for the court's holding denying municipal liability for improper revocation
of a building permit even though the owner had relied on the continuing validity of the
permit). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 131.
73. N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963). Section 8 provides:
Waiver of immunity from liability
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with
the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individu-
als or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this
article. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect, alter or repeal any
provision of the workmen's compensation law.
Id.
74. See Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1945).
75. See id. at 55, 64 N.E.2d at 706. The court underscored that waiver of tort immu-
nity does not subject a municipality to damages for acts a private person would not
perform, such as providing fire protection. Where conduct is of the type an individual
would not undertake, the only source of a cause of action is a statute which is enacted for
the special benefit of particular persons. Id. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying
text.
76. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 131 (noting that municipalities derive their
governmental characteristics from being subdivisions of the state but resemble private
1984]
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be held liable. 77 In an effort to resolve this issue, a distinction
has been drawn between the proprietary or ministerial functions
of a municipal corporation and its governmental actss.7  The mu-
nicipality enjoys tort immunity, as a subdivision of the state, for
only its governmental acts .7 Though the practical application of
this distinction produces confusing results,80 it is generally ac-
cepted that negligent performance of a statutory duty will not
result in municipal tort liability, because performance of a statu-
tory duty is a governmental act.81
Reid v. City of Niagara Falls8 2 illustrates the application of
this principle to the negligent enforcement of the Multiple Resi-
dence Law.8 3 The court in Reid would not allow suit against Ni-
agara Falls although its inspector had issued a building permit
which allowed the construction of a blatantly unsafe addition to
individuals because they are corporate entities).
77. See id. See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
53.04a (rev. 3d ed. 1977) (general discussion of municipal legislative functions and discre-
tionary acts).
78. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, § 53.04a.
79. See Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330 (2d Dep't 1964), afl'd,
15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965). The rationale for granting im-
munity for governmental acts is explained in Rottkamp: "[I1n weighing the balance be-
tween the effects of oppressive official action and vindictive or retaliatory damage suits
against the officer, we think that the public interest in prompt and fearless determina-
tions by the officer, based on his interpretation of the law and the facts before him, must
take precedence." Id. at 376, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 334. See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra
note 77, §§ 53.01-.59. Discretionary acts (also labeled judicial, quasi-judicial or legisla-
tive) are distinguishable from ministerial acts which are "absolute, certain and impera-
tive, involving merely the execution of a set task." Id. § 53.22a. The rationale for immu-
nizing discretionary acts is to maintain separation of powers which precludes the courts'
passing judgment on other branches of government. Id. § 53.04a.
80. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 131. "It has been said that the 'rules which courts
have sought to establish in solving this problem [classifying acts as governmental or pro-
prietary] are as logical as those governing French irregular verbs.'" Id. (quoting Weeks
v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166, 162 A.2d 314 (1960), afl'd, 34 N.J. 250, 168 A.2d
11 (1961)).
81. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595 (1965) (reviewing authority supporting the proposition that failure to perform a stat-
utory duty created for the benefit of the general public will not give rise to tort liability
and, on the basis of this principle, denying municipal tort liability even though a fire
marshall negligently failed to require corrections of a dangerous oil stove which violated
the Multiple Residence Law).
82. Reid v. City of Niagara Falls, 29 Misc. 2d 855, 216 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. Niag-
ara County 1961).
83. N.Y. MULT. Rasm. LAW §§ 301-305 (McKinney 1952).
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a multiple dwelling.8' While the negligence of the building in-
spector led to the death and injury of others, the Reid court ap-
plied the settled law that enforcement of the Multiple Residence
Law involves the use of discretion. 5 Thus, the city was immune
from liability for the negligence of its building inspector." In
Rottkamp v. Young,s7 a New York appellate court suggested
that discretion exists in a given case if the municipal official has
the power to grant or deny a building permit according to his
own view of the circumstances. Having ascertained that a mu-
nicipal officer has to exercise personal judgment to fulfill his
duty, the court need go no further." It should not apply a sub-
jective standard, making immunity depend upon the officer's
motives or the quality of his judgment.8 9
Nevertheless, violation of a statutory duty may, in certain
circumstances, subject a municipality to liability for damages."
If the statute has been enacted to benefit a special group, negli-
gent performance of the obligation it imposes may result in mu-
nicipal tort liability.91 This is so because any person may be lia-
ble in damages for violation of a statutory duty created to
protect a particular group of individuals. 2 A statute of this type
84. See Reid v. City of Niagara Falls, 29 Misc. 2d at 860, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
85. Id. at 860, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 855 "It would seem to be the settled law in our
jurisdiction, if not the universal rule, that a governmental unit incurs no liability to indi-
viduals for its failure to prevent violations of law or to take action to abate a nuisance
arising therefrom." Id.
86. Id.
87. 21 A.D.2d 373, 376, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, 334 (2d Dep't 1964), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 831,
205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965).
88. See id. at 376-77, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 334-35 (noting that New York grants tort
immunity to public officials acting in their official capacities and stating that the inter-
pretation of a. zoning ordinance is a discretionary governmental act).
89. See id. at 375, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The court quotes with approval an 1883
decision which states the rule that "no public officer is responsible in a civil suit for a
judicial determination, however erroneous or wrong it may be, or however malicious even
the motive which produced it." Id. (quoting East River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93
N.Y. 557, 559 (1883)).
90. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d at 139, 204 N.E.2d at 637, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 598; Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 194-95, 375 N.E.2d 763, 766, 404
N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (1978).
91. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d at 139, 204 N.E.2d at 637, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 598 (citing Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531, 108 N.E. 830 (1915); Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 286, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); RESTATEmENT OF
TORTS § 286).
92. See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. at 303-06, 200 N.E.
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is said to impose an absolute duty. s Violation of its commands
establishes negligence as a matter of law.9 4 In Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 95 a labor law prescribing the
specifications of dust-generating equipment was found to be this
type of law because it was specially intended to protect workers
exposed to such machines. At the same time, Schmidt clarified
that statutes do not create liability merely because they impose
new duties or higher standards of care.96 Laws of a general char-
acter enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole do not
automatically create liability. 7 It must be shown that the pur-
pose of the statute is to impose liability for violation of its
precepts which would not arise if the law were not in force' 8
The conduct of a government official can also narrow a gen-
eral duty in such a way that a special duty arises and liability
for negligence will result.9 9 For instance, if an official has
stepped beyond his general statutory duty to the public by ac-
tively assuming a special duty to a specific individual, liability
may follow.100 In Schuster v. City of New York, the court ap-
plied this standard, reasoning that negligent action by police in
protecting a citizen, whose aid they had actively solicited, could
lead to municipal liability. 10' The police had publicized the indi-
vidual's role in apprehending a fugitive mobster, and as a result
of inadequate police protection, he was subsequently murdered
by the captured criminal's associates. 02 The court noted that
the police were not merely negligent in failing to provide police
protection, a duty owed the general public, but had actively
brought about an injury to a specific individual. 03
By contrast, despite allegations of reckless conduct on the
at 828-30.
93. See id. at 304, 200 N.E. at 829.
94. Id.
95. 270 N.Y. 287, 303-06, 200 N.E. 824, 828-30 (1936).
96. Id. at 304-05, 200 N.E. at 829.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 305, 200 N.E. at 829.
99. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, § 53.04a.
100. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1958).
101. Id. at 79-86, 154 N.E.2d at 536-40, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268-74.
102. See id. at 87, 154 N.E.2d at 541, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
103. See id. at 82, 154 N.E.2d at 538, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
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part of officials acting pursuant to a general statutory duty, the
court in Sanchez v. Village of Liberty14 found no municipal lia-
bility. There village officials were said to have knowingly hired
an incompetent building inspector.' The village and its inspec-
tor were also accused of having failed to enforce safety laws de-
spite actual knowledge that a particular multiple dwelling vio-
lated statutory standards.'" Although a disastrous fire killed
several people, the court refused to recognize municipal tort lia-
bility, because the officials were acting pursuant to their statu-
tory duty. 07
Florence v. Goldberg'08 illustrates another way in which the
conduct of government officials can create a special duty. Liabil-
ity may follow negligent performance of a voluntarily accepted
duty which is beyond any obligation imposed for the benefit of
the general public. 0 9 In that case, New York City was held liable
for failure to protect a child who was injured by a car while
crossing a busy intersection on his way to school." 0 The court
carefully pointed out that a crucial factor in imposing liability
was the police department's voluntary assumption of the duty to
monitor school crossings when civilian guards were absent."'
This task was not part of the routine control of pedestrian or
vehicular traffic." 2 The court relied on the principle that" '[t]he
hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with im-
punity though liability would fail if it had never been applied at
all." Y118
The reasoning of Florence was specifically applied in
Gordon v. Holt"' to a municipality's negligent issuance of a cer-
104. 42 N.Y.2d 876, 366 N.E.2d 870, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1977), modifying 49 A.D.2d
507, 375 N.Y.S.2d 901 (3d Dep't 1975).
105. Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 49 A.D.2d 507, 507, 375 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (3d
Dep't 1975), modified, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 366 N.E.2d 870, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1977).
106. Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 49 A.D.2d at 509, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
107. Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d at 877-78, 366 N.E.2d at 871, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 783.
108. 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978).
109. Id. at 196-97, 375 N.E.2d at 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
110. Id. at 193, 197, 375 N.E.2d at 764, 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85, 587.
111. Id. at 196-97, 375 N.E.2d at 767-68, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587-88.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 196, 375 N.E.2d at 766, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (quoting Moch Co. v. Rens-
selaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928)).




tificate of occupancy. The owner of the premises involved re-
quested a new certificate of occupancy.11 5 Although the city did
not have a duty to issue a new certificate upon request of the
property owner, an official voluntarily complied, albeit in a neg-
ligent fashion. " 6 Since he was not acting pursuant to a statutory
duty, immunity was not available to the municipality.11
7
A special duty may also arise if a public employee in the
face of blatant safety violations acts negligently after having
taken authoritative control of a situation which poses imminent
peril." In Smullen v. City of New York,119 a city inspector was
present at the scene of the constuction of a sewer trench which
the court found to have been seriously defective. The court ac-
knowledged that an inspector's negligent failure to discover a
safety violation would not alone have given rise to tort liabil-
ity.1 20 In the absence of the private construction company's fore-
man, this official took control just as a worker was about to de-
scend into the trench, affirmatively assuring the worker that it
was safe to enter.' 2 ' The employee was killed when the trench
collapsed. 122 The Smullen court found that the inspector had
not exercised discretion, because the violations were so bla-
tant. 23 One may conclude that the court found a special duty
creating liability, since the inspector's act was an affirmative ex-
ercise of control rather than a judgment about safety as pre-
scribed by statute. 2'
appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 710 (1979) (not reported in unofficial reporters).
115. Id. at 348, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
116. Id. at 350, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
117. Id. at 350-51, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
118. Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19
(1971).
119. Id. at 70-71, 268 N.E.2d at 765, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 68-69, 268 N.E.2d at 764, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 73, 268 N.E.2d at 767, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
This, therefore, is not a case where the municipality has been found by a jury to
be liable for a mere error of judgment on the part of an employee. All the evidence
produced indicates that the inspector really had no occasion to make a judgment,
so open and obvious were the violations. The inspector's utterances, given these
conditions, cannot be viewed as representing a calculated judgment as to safety.
Id.
124. See id. The court noted that the inspector's act was "more than acquiescence
in decedent's descent . .. [, rather it was] an exercise of control by the only person in
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Finally, in at least one instance, a municipality's failure to
act has led to the imposition of tort liability. In Runkel v.
Homelsky,125 the City of New York was accused of failing to
take down an abandoned building when it had actual knowledge
that the building was a dangerous structure. 12 6 The court, rely-
ing on a statute giving the city power to abate a nuisance, found
it liable for injuries sustained by infant trespassers because the
building was inherently dangerous and in imminent danger of
collapse.12 7 The court apparently found that a special duty arose
when the city, having the power to act, did not do so despite
actual knowledge of a perilous situation.
III. Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc.
A. Facts and Procedural History
A tragic motel fire in the Town of Greece claimed the lives
of several people and resulted in extensive personal injury and
property loss. 128 Suits were brought by or on behalf of the motel
guests, naming as defendants the Town of Greece, the motel de-
velopers, the lessee/operator, and the owner of the dwelling. 2 '
Complaints against the town were dismissed as insufficient to
state a cause of action because plaintiffs alleged no more than a
breach of a general duty for which municipalities have tort im-
munity.130 The remaining defendants then sought to implead the
town for contribution and indemnity, asserting that the town
ought to be found liable for apportionment because it had been
negligent in causing or exacerbating the plaintiffs' injuries."'
The alleged tortious conduct of the town included approval of
authority then present." Id. See also Rossi, Torts, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 711, 712 (1972)
(noting that the Smullen court recognized that the situation was so dangerous as to war-
rant the conclusion that the inspector had not merely made an error in judgment but
had positively assumed control).
125. 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957).
126. Id. at 858 (text of official reporter not reprinted in unofficial reporters).
127. Id. at 859 (text of official reporter not reprinted in unofficial reporters).
128. Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253, 257, 447 N.E.2d 717, 718, 460
N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (1983).
129. Id. at 257, 447 N.E.2d at 718-19, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
130. Id. (citing Garrett v. Town of Greece, 78 A.D.2d 773, 433 N.Y.S.2d 637 (4th
Dep't 1980), aff'd on opinion below, 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1981)).




construction plans which did not comply with safety laws, issu-
ance of a certificate of occupancy despite blatant safety viola-
tions, and failure to uncover these dangerous conditions during
subsequent building inspections."3 2 On the strength of these as-
sertions, defendants claimed that Nolecheck v. Gesuale" enti-
tled them to seek contribution from a concurrent tortfeasor.1 "
Special term denied the town's motion to dismiss the third party
complaint.135
The appellate division unanimously reversed, holding that
the third party complaints were insufficient at law. " 6 After con-
sidering the differences between contribution and indemnity,1 8 7
the court concluded that both causes of action require that the
party from whom apportionment is sought owe a duty of care to
the injured plaintiff.'" Based on this analysis, the court was
compelled to dismiss defendants' complaint because, in an ear-
lier decision, it had ruled that the Town of Greece owed no duty
to the primary plaintiffs.13 9
B. Opinion of the Court of Appeals
1. The majority
The New York Court of Appeals modified the decision of
the appellate division and held that the defendants could state a
cause of action against the Town of Greece even though the
town owed no duty to the injured parties. 14 0 Writing for the
court, Judge Wachtler explained that the objective of Dole ap-
portionment"' is to require a party responsible for injury to a
plaintiff to pay a share of the damages in proportion to his de-
132. Id. at 257-58, 447 N.E.2d at 719, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
133. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). See supra notes 60-
70 and accompanying text.
134. Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 469, 472, 450 N.Y.S.2d 619, 622 (3d
Dep't 1982), modified, 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
135. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 258, 447 N.E.2d at 719, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
136. Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 A.D.2d at 475, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
137. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
138. Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 A.D.2d at 471, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
139. Garrett v. Town of Greece, 78 A.D.2d 773, 443 N.Y.S.2d 637 (4th Dep't 1980).
140. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 261, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
141. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972). See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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gree of fault.1 " Although acknowledging the general rule that to
be held proportionately liable a wrongdoer must owe a duty di-
rectly to the injured person,1 3 the court observed "that propor-
tionate liability rights among joint tort-feasors are analytically
distinct from the rights and obligations of the parties to the in-
jured person and that the nexus of duty between wrongdoers
may exist independently of the respective duties owing a plain-
tiff.' ' 4 4 The court explained that New York case law supported
this proposition, citing two indemnification cases as authority:1 4 5
Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co. 1 6 and Westchester Lighting
Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.1 47 Each case al-
lowed indemnification from parties who were immune from di-
rect suit by the plaintiff, but who owed the defendants an inde-
pendent duty.4 8
While denying defendants' claim for implied indemnifica-
tion, the court ultimately approved the third party claim for ap-
portionment relying on its holding in Nolechek.14 The court
considered the defendants' claim in Garrett v. Holiday Inns,
Inc. to be in harmony with the principle which requires a wrong-
doer to be responsible for the injury he causes. 50 The court con-
cluded that
if the town owed a duty to appellants to protect them from fore-
seeable risks of harm, the breach of which has combined with ap-
pellants' own negligence to render them answerable in damages to
the injured motel guests, the town should be required to bear re-
sponsibility for the injury its negligence has caused appellants, in
proportion to its own degree of fault.' 1
The court next concluded that the Town of Greece had
breached an actionable special duty when it negligently ap-
142. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 258, 447 N.E.2d at 719, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
143. Id. at 258, 447 N.E.2d at 719, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
144. Id. at 259, 447 N.E.2d at 720, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 259 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 720 n.3, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 777 n.3.
146. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text.
147. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
148. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
149. Id. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.





proved changes in the motel's construction plans which were in
conflict with fire safety laws and when it improperly issued a
certificate of occupancy. 12 The court rejected the town's conten-
tion that these acts were discretionary. " While issuance of a
certificate of occupancy is usually deemed a discretionary act,
the court found the facts of the instant case distinguishable and,
as such, found a special duty.1 54 The Town of Greece "had a
duty, in the face of the alleged blatant and dangerous code viola-
tions, to refuse to issue a certificate of occupancy."16 6 Therefore,
the court concluded that the issuance of a certificate of occu-
pancy did not involve any exercise of judgment.'66
Furthermore, the court noted additional grounds which, if
proven, would establish the existence of a special duty 67 owed
to the defendants by the town. " 8 The complaints accused
Greece officials of actual knowledge of severe safety violations.1 5 9
The court characterized the act of certifying that the premises
were free of safety violations as an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion. 60 Furthermore, the court indicated in a footnote that it in-
terpreted the language of section 302(5) of the Multiple Resi-
dence Law' 6' as contemplating a special relationship between
municipalities issuing certificates of occupancy and purchasers
of multiple residences.'12
The court stated that the town may be held proportionately
152. See id. at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. See supra notes
82-89.
155. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (footnote
omitted).
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 90-124 and accompanying text.
158. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 261-64, 447 N.E.2d at 721-23, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-80.
159. Id. at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
160. Id. at 263 n.5, 447 N.E.2d at 722 n.5, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779 n.5.
161. N.Y. MULT. REsID. LAW § 302(5) (McKinney 1952).
162. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 622 n.4, 447 N.E.2d at 722 n.4, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779 n.4.
The court specifically pointed to the following language:
[Wihenever any person [a good faith purchaser of a multiple dwelling] has so re-
lied upon such a certificate [of occupancy], no claim that such dwelling had not,
prior to the issuance of such certificate, conformed in all respects to the provisions
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liable to the defendants."' The court's conclusion was predi-
cated on its findings that apportionment may be based on the
breach of an independent duty owed by the town to the defen-
dants'" and that defendants had alleged the facts which, if
proven, would be sufficient to establish the existence of such a
special duty.165
2. The dissent
Judge Jasen,"1 6 dissenting in part, agreed that the town may
be held proportionately liable for a breach of an independent
duty owed to the defendants. 17 On the basis of precedent, how-
ever, he believed that no actionable duty existed in this case."'8
Citing cases he considered factually indistinguishable, where no
special duty had been recognized, he urged that stare decisis be
observed. 169 Municipalities, he reasoned, had relied on immunity
in the absence of a special duty for purposes of fiscal
planning.1 70
The dissent also pointed to O'Connor v. City of New
York,"' decided on the same day as Garrett, where the court
reached an opposite result about the existence of a special duty
163. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The defen-
dants characterized the injury they sustained as a result of the tortious conduct as expo-
sure to "economic damages they may suffer as a result of judgment against them in favor
of the motel guests." Id. at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
164. See id. at 261, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778. See supra notes 140-51
and accompanying text.
165. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. See
supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
166. Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part and voted to affirm for the reasons stated
in the opinion of the appellate division. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 266, 447 N.E.2d at 724,
460 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting in part). See supra notes 136-39, and ac-
companying text. Judge Jasen dissented in part and voted to affirm in a separate opin-
ion. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 264-66, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81 (Jasen,
J., dissenting in part).
167. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 264, 447 N.E.2d at 723, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 264-65, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Jasen, J., dissenting
in part).
169. Id. at 266, 477 N.E.2d at 724, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Jasen, J., dissenting in
part).
170. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting in part).




in factually similar circumstances. 2 O'Connor involved the neg-
ligence of a city inspector, who not only failed to discover a bla-
tant violation in a system of gas pipes being installed, but issued
a "blue card" certifying that the pipes conformed to regula-
tions.173 When gas service was restored, an explosion occurred,
killing twelve people and injuring many more.17 4 Judge Jasen
viewed the inspector's conduct as "active misrepresentation"
and indistinguishable from the town's acts in Garrett, and yet
the court in O'Connor found no special duty.175
IV. Analysis
Although the court may have reached an equitable result in
Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,7 6 it did so by changing the re-
quirement for contribution and by announcing a new interpreta-
tion of the special duty rule which departs substantially from
precedent. The court did not state that its decision in Garrett
presented new rules of law. Rather, it attempted to harmonize
decisions which are inconsistent and factually distinguishable.
A. Contribution, Indemnity, or Apportionment?
The court in Garrett found that the Town of Greece could
be held proportionately liable to defendants for its breach of an
independent duty owed to them.17 7 In so doing, the court con-
cluded that the defendants had stated no basis for liability
based on implied indemnification. 17 To have permitted a claim
for indemnity would have meant that the defendants, "if held
liable to the plaintiff [were] being cast in damages solely for the
negligence of the town or on the basis of vicarious or imputed
172. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 265-66, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81
(Jasen, J., dissenting in part).
173. O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 447 N.E.2d at 33-34, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 485-86.
174. Id.
175. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 265, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting in part). See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
176. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1983).
177. Id. at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. See supra notes 140-51 and
accompanying text.
178. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. See supra
notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
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liability.' 1 79 Clearly, the court could not permit such a claim in
view of its earlier decision that the town owed no duty to the
original plaintiff.180 The majority, however, avoided directly la-
beling defendants' successful claim as one for contribution.
Rather, its analysis blurred the distinction between contribution
and indemnity.
The rule of apportionment announced in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co., 81 addresses the scope of liability for damages and
how such damages are to be shared among joint tortfeasors.182 It
is not intended to vary the tortfeasors' substantive duties. 83
Clearly, equitable apportionment does not encompass allocating
damages to parties who owe no duty of care to an injured plain-
tiff.'" Having conclusively determined that the town had no
duty to the injured plaintiffs' 85 and, therefore, no obligation to
indemnify the defendants, the court nevertheless permitted a
claim for apportionment i8 s without presenting a persuasive case
for contribution.
The court began with the proposition that proportionate lia-
bility rights flow from the breach of duty owed to a defendant
by the party from whom he seeks a share of the damages. 87 The
substantial weight of authority is to the contrary. 88 Clearly, the
law of New York State has required that contribution rights fol-
low only where both the defendant and the party from whom
contribution is sought are liable to the injured plaintiff.189 With
the exception of Nolechek v. Gesuale,190 cases which allowed
179. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. See supra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
180. Garrett v. Town of Greece, 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1981). See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
181. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See supra notes 40-46
and accompanying text.
182. See Rogers v. Dorchester Ass'n, 32 N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347
N.Y.S.2d 22, 31 (1973).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Garrett v. Town of Greece, 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1981). See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
186. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
187. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 261, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
188. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
189. Id.




contribution absent common liability did so because of the exis-
tence of a common duty to the plaintiff.191 The court explicitly
took note of its earlier opinion in Garrett v. Town of Greece,'"
which held that the town owed no duty to the injured plain-
tiffs. 9' Thus, the decision to allow defendants in this case to
seek contribution from the town is inconsistent with prior tort
liability cases which required at least the showing of a duty, if
not liability, running from the contribution defendant to the in-
jured plaintiff.'94
Noting that under current law contribution would likely be
denied, the court merely repeated its proposition that propor-
tionate liability rights among joint tortfeasors may be analyzed
as distinct from the duties owed to the plaintiff.' In a foot-
note, 96 it sought to provide support for this idea by citing Schu-
bert v. Schubert Wagon Co.'97 and Westchester Lighting Co. v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corp.'es These, of course,
are indemnification cases, and the court had soundly rejected
defendants' claim for indemnity from Greece.199 Additionally,
the reasoning of Schubert underscores the flaws of the Garrett
opinion, rather than strengthening its argument. In Schubert
the court recognized that the wrongdoer from whom the defend-
ant might seek indemnification also owed a duty of care, albeit a
and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
192. 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1981).
193. 58 N.Y.2d at 257, 447 N.E.2d at 719, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
194. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
195. See Garrett, 58 N.Y. at 259, 447 N.E.2d at 720, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 777. The court
stated:
Of course, the holdings in such cases do not resolve the precise question raised on
the present appeal, for those cases involved circumstances in which the third
party had no liability to the injured person, in contrast to the absence of a duty
owed him. Nevertheless, these cases demonstrate that proportionate liability
rights among joint tortfeasors are analytically distinct from the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties to the injured person and that the nexus of duty between
wrongdoers may exist independently of the respective duties owing a plaintiff.
Id. (footnote omitted).
196. Id. at 259 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 720 n.3, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 777 n.3.
197. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text.
198. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
199. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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non-actionable one, to the plaintiff."' The court of appeals had
recognized earlier, however, that the Town of Greece owed no
duty of care to the injured plaintiffs. 2 1 Therefore, it cannot be
said that the defendants would be paying damages rightfully at-
tributable to the town - the crux of indemnity. Westchester
Lighting Co. similarly adds nothing to the court's argument, for
it merely stands for the now unremarkable proposition that an
employer may not, on the basis of the workers' compensation
law, evade the obligation to pay damages to a defendant who has
paid more than his fair share to the employer's worker where
both the defendant and employer have violated duties owed to
the worker.20 2 The reasoning of this case is unpersuasive in the
context of Garrett, because the New York Court of Appeals had
authoritatively stated that the Town of Greece owed no duty to
the injured plaintiffs.2 03
Nolechek v. Gesuale2 " is the only precedent on which the
majority can colorably rest its decision, for it alone allowed con-
tribution from a third party defendant based solely on the
breach of his duty to the third party plaintiff, absent a duty to
the plaintiff. Nevertheless, because Garrett lacks the special cir-
205 ms ocumstances present in Nolechek, one must conclude that
when taken together these cases change the rules of contribu-
tion. In Nolechek, the third party defendant from whom contri-
bution was sought was the plaintiff, who sought full compensa-
tion from the defendant.20 6 At the same time, this plaintiff had
seriously breached an independent duty to the defendant by
conduct which clearly contributed to the injury giving rise to
200. See Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. at 256-57, 164 N.E. at 43. See
supra notes 32-35.
201. Garrett v. Town of Greece, 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1981). See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
202. See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278
N.Y. 175, 180, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568-69 (1938). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
203. Garrett v. Town of Greece, 55 N.Y.2d 774, 431 N.E.2d 971, 447 N.Y.S.2d 246
(1981). See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
204. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). See supra notes 60-
70 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.




plaintiff's suit2°7 The Nolechek plaintiff/third party defendant
would have unfairly avoided his obligation of contribution only
because New York State does not recognize that a parent owes a
duty of care to his child.20 8 Clearly, none of the special equitable
considerations in Nolechek were present in Garrett. The Town
of Greece did not initiate the suit and certainly had not sought
to recover damages for harm which occurred in part because of
its own negligence.
The court forthrightly rejected defendants' indemnification
claim,2 0 9 but failed to present a persuasive case for allowing a
contribution claim. Moreover, the majority finds liability with-
out explicitly calling the defendants' claim one of contribution.
Perhaps the court has developed a new cause of action for "ap-
portionment" from a third party defendant who need not have
breached a duty owed to the injured plaintiff.2 10
B. Expanding Tort Liability
1. Failure to enforce the Multiple Residence Law - a
non-discretionary act
The court determined that the town's acts were not discre-
tionary and consequently were not protected by immunity.2 1  In
doing so, the majority failed to take into account the precedent
which recognized that issuing building permits, granting certifi-
207. Id. at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46.
208. Id. at 342-43, 385 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346. See supra note 64
and accompanying text.
209. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
210. The Garrett majority never discussed the alternative of sustaining defendants'
contribution claim based on the existence of a non-actionable general duty of care run-
ning from the town to the injured plaintiffs. The court of appeals had pointed out in
Schuster that a duty to protect the public existed before waiver of immunity, which only
shielded a municipality against liability for its negligence. See Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 83, 154 N.E.2d 534, 538-39, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271-72 (1958). Courts
have, of course, allowed contribution where a party owes a duty to a plaintiff but cannot
be held directly liable in damages. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
See Municipality Issuing Certificate of Occupancy, Though Not Liable to Guests
Injured by Fire, May Have to Contribute to Owners Who Are, No. 280 N.Y. ST. B.A.
N.Y. ST. L. DIG. (Apr. 1983) (commenting that although the court denies a claim for
indemnification, its decision allowing apportionment permits defendants to state a com-
plaint which resembles indemnification in almost every sense).
211. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. See supra
notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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cates of occupancy, and conducting continuing building inspec-
tions are discretionary acts, however poorly performed.212 The
court reasoned that the existence of blatant code violations re-
moved the need to exercise judgment in evaluating the applica-
tion for a certificate of occupancy.213 In finding the acts to be
nondiscretionary, the court apparently considered the degree of
error committed by the officials. In the past, however, this con-
sideration had rarely influenced judicial determinations of mu-
nicipal liability.2 14
Even in the limited circumstances where the court had rec-
ognized blatant errors as giving rise to municipal liability, it
based its determination on factors not present in Garrett. All
the official acts in Garrett - issuing building permits, granting
certificates of occupancy, and conducting building inspections -
were routine functions performed pursuant to a statutory duty
and involved the exercise of judgment.21 5 In finding municipal
liability in Runkel v. Homelsky, 16 the court focused on official
inaction in abating a nuisance which posed imminent danger
and the threat of immediate injury to the public. In Smullen v.
City of New York, 17 it was the official's authoritative assump-
tion of control at the moment of imminent peril that prompted
the court to recognize municipal liability. In contrast, the Gar-
rett court did not point to the existence of an imminent public
hazard or to official acts that would constitute an authoritative
assumption of control in a perilous situation. While the judg-
ments made by officials in Greece were arguably improper, they
were routine and discretionary. The policy reasons for protecting
municipal officials from civil suit for the exercise of discretion
212. Rottkamp v. Young, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965),
afl'g 21 A.D.2d 373, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330 (2d Dep't 1964); Reid v. Niagara Falls, 29 Misc. 2d
855, 216 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1961). See supra notes 82-89 and ac-
companying text.
213. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
214. Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d at 375, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 334. See supra notes 84-
89, 119-24 and accompanying text.
215. See generally N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW §§ 301-307 (McKinney 1952) (describing
enforcement duties of officials).
216. 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957). See supra notes 125-27
and accompanying text.





would be undermined if immunity were granted only when good
judgment had been exercised.
2. Finding a special duty
Defendants may, according to the majority in Garrett, state
a claim for proportionate liability against the town, if the town
has breached an independent duty owed to the defendants and
that conduct bears a sufficiently close relation to that which in-
jured the plaintiff. 18 The court permitted the claim to stand
based on a finding that the town owed a special duty to the de-
fendants.219 Though the court in Garrett did not present a de-
tailed discussion of the nexus between the town's negligence and
that of the defendants, one may conclude that defendants' expo-
sure to potential tort liability, for which the court considered the
town at least partially responsible, provides that link.220
The Garrett analysis is flawed because the facts of the case
do not support the existence of a special duty to the defendants.
First, the court suggested that a special duty exists because the
town has failed to enforce a statute designed for the special ben-
efit of defendants.22' The court, in a footnote, suggested that
section 302(5) of the Multiple Residence Law2 22 "appears to con-
template a special relationship between the municipality and a
person relying on its certificate [of occupancy] .'223 The statutory
language at issue provides:
A certificate, a record in the department, or a statement signed
by the head of the department that a certificate has been issued,
may be relied upon by every person who in good faith purchases a
multiple dwelling or who in good faith lends money upon the se-
curity of a mortgage covering such a dwelling. Whenever any per-
son has so relied upon such a certificate, no claim that such dwell-
ing had not, prior to the issuance of such certificate, conformed in
all respects to the provisions of this chapter shall be made against
such person or his successor in title or ownership with respect to
such multiple dwelling or mortgage, or against the interest of any
218. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 261, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
219. See id. at 261-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
220. Id. at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779. See supra note 163.
221. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
222. N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 302(5) (McKinney 1952).
223. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262 n.4, 447 N.E.2d at 722 n.4, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779 n.4.
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such person with respect thereto.2 2"
The court did not discuss the basis for its interpretation
that this statute was enacted for the special benefit of owners of
multiple residences. A fair reading of section 302(5) suggests
that the legislature intended to protect purchasers of multiple
residences to the limited extent of saving owners who had relied
on existing certificates of occupancy from having the very offi-
cials who had issued the permits return with new demands for
costly repairs based on findings inconsistent with the represen-
tations made in the original permits.22 5 However, one cannot
find in the language of the statute or in its legislative history any
evidence of intent to create broader municipal liability for im-
proper issuance of certificates of occupancy. It is unlikely that
the legislature would by implication alone expand municipal tort
liability to include responsibility for damages that an owner of
an unsafe multiple dwelling might incur merely because it issued
a certificate which should have been withheld.226 In fact, the
overall purpose of the Multiple Residence Law is to protect per-
sons who live in those dwellings, not to safeguard the interests of
their owners.227
Next, the court stated that the issuance of the certificate of
occupancy is an affirmative act which ultimately gives rise to a
special duty.228 The court correctly pointed to Florence v.
Goldberg22e as authority for the proposition that an affirmative
act coupled with reliance may result in a special relationship
leading to a special duty.23 0 It failed to recognize, however, that
the facts of Garrett were quite different. In Florence, the official
224. N.Y. MUzLT. RESID. LAW § 302(5) (McKinney 1952).
225. The chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee which proposed the Multiple
Residence Law stated that its overall aim was to protect persons living in multiple dwell-
ings. See Mitchell, Forward to N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW at v-viii (McKinney 1952). See
supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the characteristics of a
statute enacted for the special benefit of a class of persons such that liability flows auto-
matically from breach of its precepts.
226. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
227. See Mitchell, supra note 225.
228. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
229. 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978). See supra notes 108-
13 and accompanying text.




conduct was entirely voluntary,2 81 whereas the officials in the
Town of Greece were merely fulfilling obligations prescribed by
the Multiple Residence Law.232 Therefore, the affirmative con-
duct in Garrett, as opposed to that in Florence, was the product
of carrying out a normal governmental function. Thus, in de-
parting from precedent, the court left open the possibility that
normal government duties, if negligently performed, may result
in municipal tort liability.
Finally, Garrett erred in citing Smullen as authority for
finding, that the affirmative conduct of the town officials gave
rise to a special duty.2" In Smullen, a government agent took
authoritative control and direction under circumstances where a
known and blatantly dangerous violation existed.2 ' By contrast,
no such official authoritative assumption of control at the point
of imminent danger was alleged in Garrett. It was unwarranted
for the court to equate a situation in which an official merely
performs his job negligently, even in the face of extremely seri-
ous violations, with a circumstance in which a government offi-
cial assumes control and direction at a moment of mortal peril.
For further support that the court incorrectly applied the
Smullen rule, one need only look to O'Connor v. City of New
York.2 ' 5 There the court reiterated its long-held position that
negligent performance of statutory duties, even when the official
is faced with unmistakenly severe safety violations, will not give
rise to a special duty resulting in liability.2 6
V. Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals in Garrett v. Holiday Inns,
Inc.23 7 permitted a defendant to seek apportionment from a
joint tortfeasor who owed no duty of care to the injured plaintiff.
231. Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 196-97, 375 N.E.2d 763, 767-68, 404
N.Y.S.2d 583, 587-88 (1978).
232. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
233. Garrett, 58 N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
234. Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 68-69, 268 N.E.2d 763, 764, 320
N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (1971). See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
235. 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983).
236. See O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 189-90, 447 N.E.2d 33, 34-
36, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486-88 (1983). See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
237. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
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Perhaps, as in Nolechek v. Gesuale," the majority responded
primarily to the unfairness of allowing a seriously negligent
party to escape all responsibility for damages. The fact that the
unique equitable considerations of Nolechek were not present,
however, suggests that Garrett changes the law of contribution
in New York.
Even the Garrett court's expanded concept of contribution,
however, required a finding that the town owed an actionable
duty of care to the defendants. Apparently wishing to retain the
special duty rule which severely circumscribes municipal tort lia-
bility, the court avoided an analysis of the continuing validity of
the rule. Rather, in order to permit apportionment from the
Town of Greece, the court dramatically extended the circum-
stances in Which a special duty will arise.
Although these changes may be long overdue, the way in
which the Garrett court effected them is unfortunate. Rather
than forthrightly announcing a modification of the law of contri-
bution and municipal tort liability, the court suggested that it
was following precedent. This sub silentio change of the law is
likely to create substantial confusion concerning the scope and
application of Garrett apportionment.
Jean E. Burke
238. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
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